Amongst other countries, the Netherlands currently allows euthanasia, provided the physician performing the procedure adheres to a strict set of requirements. In 2016, Second Chamber member Pia Dijkstra submitted a law proposal which would also allow euthanasia without the reason necessarily having any medical foundation; euthanasia on the basis of a completed life. The debate on this topic has been ongoing for over two decades, but this law proposal has made the discussion much more immediate and concrete. This paper considers (...) the moral permissibility of Pia Dijkstra’s law proposal, focusing on the ethics of the implementation Dijkstra describes in her proposal. I argue that, at present, Dijkstra’s law proposal is unsuitable for implementation, due to a number of as of yet unaddressed problems, including the possible development of an ageist stigma and undue pressure on the profession of end-of-life coordinator. Perhaps adequate responses can be conceived to address these issues. However, the existence of a radically different, yet currently equally unacceptable position regarding the implementation of euthanasia for a completed life as proposed by fellow party member Paul Schnabel suggests it may be difficult to formulate an ethically acceptable implementation for this, in principle, ethically acceptable concept. (shrink)

This article reviews and corrects frequent misunderstandings of somaesthetics, the multidisciplinary field of study of the lived body conceived by Richard Shusterman. After responding to an article published in Contemporary Pragmatism, I extend the discussion to cover larger topics of discussion related to somaesthetics and misapprehensions by its critics, including the nature of somatic experience, the role of pleasure, and the relevance of culture. In rectifying mistakes of understanding, it is hoped the effort will foster better understanding and better critique.

Recent highly publicized privacy breaches in health care and genomics research have led many to question whether current standards of data protection are adequate. Improvements in de-identification techniques, combined with pervasive data sharing, have increased the likelihood that external parties can track individuals across multiple databases. This paper focuses on the communication of identifiability risks in the process of obtaining consent for donation and research. Most ethical discussions of identifiability risks have focused on the severity of the risk and how (...) it might be mitigated, and what precisely is at stake in pervasive data sharing. However, there has been little discussion of whether and how to communicate the risk to potential donors. We review the ethical arguments behind favoring different types of risk communication in the consent process, and outline how identifiability concerns can be incorporated into either a detailed or simplified method of communicating risks during the consent process. (shrink)

This major addition to Ideas in Context examines the development of natural law theories in the early stages of the Enlightenment in Germany and France. T. J. Hochstrasser investigates the influence exercised by theories of natural law from Grotius to Kant, with a comparative analysis of the important intellectual innovations in ethics and political philosophy of the time. Hochstrasser includes the writings of Samuel Pufendorf and his followers who evolved a natural law theory based on human sociability and reason, fostering (...) a new methodology in German philosophy. This book assesses the first histories of political thought since ancient times, giving insights into the nature and influence of debate within eighteenth-century natural jurisprudence. Ambitious in range and conceptually sophisticated, Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment will be of great interest to scholars in history, political thought, law and philosophy. Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment has been selected as the winner of the annual Morris D. Forkosch Prize for the best book in intellectual history published in 2000. (shrink)

Some philosophers have thought that life could only be meaningful if there is no God. For Sartre and Nagel, for example, a God of the traditional classical theistic sort would constrain our powers of self-creative autonomy in ways that would severely detract from the meaning of our lives, possibly even evacuate our lives of all meaning. Some philosophers, by contrast, have thought that life could only be meaningful if there is a God. God and the Meanings of Life is interested (...) in exploring the truth in both these schools of thought, seeking to discover what God could and couldn't do to make life meaningful (as well as what he would and wouldn't do). Mawson espouses a version of the 'amalgam' or 'pluralism' thesis about the issue of life's meaning – in essence, that there are a number of different legitimate meanings of 'meaning' (and indeed 'life') in the question of life's meaning. According to Mawson, God, were he to exist, would help make life meaningful in some of these senses and hinder in some others. He argues that whilst there could be meaning in a Godless universe, there could be other sorts of meaning in a Godly one and that these would be deeper. (shrink)

T.J. Reed's study has long established itself as the standard work in English on Thomas mann, and offers as comprehensive a view of Mann's fiction and thought as is available in any language. It is based on a coherent close reading of Mann's oeuvre, literary and political, and also on manuscripts and sources, and was part of the first phase of literary scholarship that opened up the resources of the Zurich Thomas Mann Archive. Further documents that have appeared since then (...) - Mann's diaries, notebooks, and other correspondences - have not fundamentally altered the individual interpretations or the overall picture the study offers, and in some respects have emphatically confirmed them. A further chapter added to this edition covers the new documentation, gives a vigorous account of the main curents in Mann scholarship and criticism over the last two decades suggesting how we should now see the writer, the man, and the political figure, and above all the complex relationship between the three. (shrink)

Sometimes ordinary disagreements become deep as a result of epistemic injustice. The paper explores a hitherto unnoticed connection between two phenomena that have received ample attention in recent social epistemology: deep disagreement and epistemic injustice. When epistemic injustice comes into play in a regular disagreement, this can lead to higher-order disagreement about what counts as evidence concerning the original disagreement, which deepens the disagreement. After considering a common definition of deep disagreement, it is proposed that the depth of disagreements is (...) best understood as a matter of degree. Then, a case study of real-life disagreement is introduced: the disagreement about whether racism is a significant issue in the Netherlands, illustrated by the tradition of ‘Black Pete’. It is argued that there is disagreement about what counts as evidence in the case study because of two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. Specifically, there is disagreement about epistemic principles concerning whether private first-personal experience of racism is a weighty source of evidence in this domain, whether victims of racism count as important testifiers in this domain, and how to assess testimony that is not intelligible to you because it employs concepts and terminology you are unfamiliar with. By dismissing the relevant testimony and epistemic resources, the disagreement boils down to disagreement on the level of epistemic principles concerning,, and. Introducinginjustice-based deep disagreementhighlights moral and political aspects of disagreements that might seem factual. (shrink)

Most philosophers and psychologists who have explored the psychology of climate change have focused only on motivational issues—getting people to act on what morality requires of them. This is misleading, however, because there are other psychological processes directed not at motivation but rather our ability to grasp the implications of climate change in a general way—what Stephen Gardiner has called the ‘grasping problem’. Taking the grasping problem as my departure point, I draw two conclusions from the relevant psychological literature: 1) (...) ethicists and policy makers should focus less on changing individuals’ behaviors and more on changing policy; and 2) even though solutions to climate change must come at the level of policy, progress on this front will be limited by incompatible moral norms. (shrink)

Social theory remains puzzled by the relation between practices and structures, or the link between ‘micro’ and ‘macro’. Grand theorists including Giddens and Bourdieu have gained distinction for their writings on these questions, trying to marry insights and concerns of a ‘micro’ sociological nature with traditional ‘macro’ structural questions including inequality, power relations, and social reproduction. These theorists arguably fail, however, in their attempts to move social theory beyond traditional dualisms. Relevant but neglected contributions from ethnomethodology are introduced and compared (...) to the work of Giddens and Bourdieu in an attempt to identify and outline an approach to practices and structures that more reliably avoids problems of dualism and reification, and at the same time offers an understanding of structures and their relations to practices that can be much more closely grounded in empirical studies. Key Words: micro-macro link • reification • ethnomethodology • Pierre Bourdieu • Jeff Coulter. (shrink)

Scientific tradition holds that it is essential to permit individual researchers almost complete freedom in their selection of research projects. As a result, structured research planning has not played a major role in determining the course of the sciences. By “structural research planning” we mean the methodical establishment of goals, and the identification of research routines which apparently accord priority to highest value goals, while minimizing the cost and time of their attainment. With increasing competition for limited fiscal and intellectual (...) resources this kind of planning may become more necessary. Let us cite three specific examples: First, the individual researcher is often faced with the question of how best to spend his time in pursuing a particular line of investigation. He must allocate his personal resources of time and talent to work which appears to hold the promise of highest pay-off. Second, on a larger scale, the competition for resources also raises the question of priority among alternative government-sponsored research projects. Individuals proposing equally alluring projects sometimes seek the same funds; government planners need some sort of objective criteria in order to judge the proposals. Furthermore, government planners face the problem of justifying their request for “big science” resources; a planning strategy which defines the use and expected output of the requested resources can help in the design and promotion of their concept. Finally, there is a growing sentiment that at least some research should be directed toward the solution of current and anticipated societal problems, to find means of circumventing or minimizing the impact of potentially dangerous problems of civilization. These needs : the choice of individual research, allocation of national resources among competing projects, and selecting research of societal importance, suggest that structured research planning might be valuable. (shrink)

T. J. Smiley; XII.—Entailment and Deducibility, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 233–254, https://doi.org/10.1093.

This series of articles argues for a different relationship between investigators and subjects of clinical research based on partnership in shared aims and recognition, by each, of their duties within this partnership. This second essay describes how those duties arise and explores the basis on which, and by and to whom, they are owed. The conclusion that patients have duties in research raises a number of moral issues which, ultimately, question the concept of consent. Discussion of these will be continued (...) in future articles. (shrink)

In a series of articles, I argue for a different relationship between investigators and subjects of clinical research – one that is based on partnership in shared aims. This would require significant behavioural change since any relationship of this nature requires each partner to recognise their duties within it. This third essay examines the duties that would fall on patients in this partnership.

Foucault’s critics have often ignored or misunderstool Foucault’s later work, The History of Sexuality and related texts. Only by careful reading of these texts is it possible to appreciate the maturity of Foucault’s social critism, to distil an implicit social theory from his writings, and to gage the true significance of his contributions. In this paper, The History of Sexuality is first placed in the context of Foucault’s earlier works, then used, along with other texts, to answer the most common (...) and famous critiques of his work. In the process, the contours and virtues of Foucault’s implicit social theory are indicated. Similarities with Nietzsche, Weber and Critical Theory are mentioned, but it is suggested that Foucault is in many ways a unique and uniquely significant thinker. Finally, it is argued that Foucault’s works should not be dismissed, as is all too common, but that his provocative reformation of social theory can and should be received and criticized as such. (shrink)

The theme of this volume is natural beauty, landscape and the arts. The first question for a philosopher to ask is what does philosophy have to say now particularly about natural beauty. I emphasize now, because, as is well known, historically philosophers, for example, Plato and the eighteenth-century British, and especially Scottish, philosophers, were interested in the topic of beauty. At the present day there has also been some revival of interest in this subject, but when it comes to what (...) philosophers past and present have had to say about beauty, I am doubtful how much relevance it has to the question of how we should think about natural beauty. We must be careful then in an inquiry into natural beauty not to begin by taking up some question within the traditional philosophy of beauty – such as for instance whether beauty is a real quality, or whether judgments of beauty are subjective or objective – for it is difficult to see what such metaphysical lucubrations could do for the question in hand, other than offering, what is not to be underestimated, an innocent form of academic pleasure.In any case, the modern world takes a short cut with the question of beauty: everyone, unless having a distinct reason for believing the contrary, such as a specific religious faith, unhesitatingly takes it for granted that an extreme subjectivism and relativism must hold sway. (shrink)

The standard approach to protecting privacy in healthcare aims to control access to personal information. We cannot regain control of information after it has been shared, so we must restrict access from the start. This ‘control’ conception of privacy conflicts with data-intensive initiatives like precision medicine and learning health systems, as they require patients to give up significant control of their information. Without adequate alternatives to the control-based approach, such data-intensive programmes appear to require a loss of privacy. This paper (...) argues that the control view of privacy is shortsighted and overlooks important ways to protect health information even when widely shared. To prepare for a world where we no longer control our data, we must pursue three alternative strategies: obfuscate health data, penalise the misuse of health data and improve transparency around who shares our data and for what purposes. Prioritising these strategies is necessary when health data are widely shared both within and outside of the health system. (shrink)

The aim of the My Character project was to develop a better understanding of how interventions designed to develop character might enhance moral formation and futuremindedness in young people. Futuremindedness can be defined as an individual’s capacity to set goals and make plans to achieve them. Establishing goals requires considerable moral reflection, and the achievement of worthwhile aims requires character traits such as courage and the capacity to delay gratification. The research team developed two new educational interventions – a website (...) and a hard-copy journal – with the specific aim of developing future-mindedness. After development, the website and journal were piloted over a one-year period by over 1,000 11–14 year olds in six schools across England. Various research methods, including group interviews and case studies, were implemented to assess impact. In addition, a pilot RCT was conducted to assess the feasibility of using experimental methods to measure character. The main findings from the research are that: - Students benefit from opportunities in school to think about future-mindedness; this can be successfully taught through character education. - Harnessing new technology, such as the Internet, offers exciting opportunities for character education. - It is beneficial to investigate the impact of new character education resources in order to bring greater clarity about ‘what works’. The most useful approach is a mixed methods one that allows for triangulation of evidence. - It is possible to run RCTs and other experimental research in schools to assess developmental projects of this kind, but applying the method in schools and creating suitable outcome measures present challenges for researchers. - A positive indicator of the success is that five out of the six pilot schools have embedded My Character into their curriculum. In addition, many new schools, both in Britain and internationally, have started to use the website and / or journal. This report describes the research, analyses the impact of My Character and concludes with recommendations for policy makers, practitioners and researchers embarking on similar projects. These recommendations include: i) advocating that schools create space in the curriculum to teach future-mindedness through character education; ii) enhancing traditional character education teaching methods with opportunities brought by Internet technologies; iii) evaluating character education interventions using triangulated evidence drawn from a mixture of research methods. (shrink)

Recently, in Found. Phys. 53: 64 (2023), it has been argued that there is no reality to the PBR theorem. In Found. Phys. 54: 36 (2024), Hofer-Szabó has commented that the argument is flawed and that PBR theorem remains in tact. Here we reply to Hofer-Szabó by showing that his counterargument does not hold up, concluding that the PBR theorem has been disproved.

This paper attempts to explain how and why nonhuman animals elicit disgust in human beings. I argue that animals elicit disgust in two ways. One is by triggering disease–protection mechanisms, and the other is by eliciting mortality salience, or thoughts of death. I discuss how these two types of disgust operate and defend their conceptual and theoretical coherence against common objections. I also outline an explanatory challenge for disgust researchers. Both types of disgust indicate that a wide variety of animals (...) produce aversive and avoidant reactions in human beings. This seems somewhat odd, given the prominence of animals in human lives. The challenge, then, is explaining how humans cope with the presence of animals. I propose, as a hypothesis for further exploration, that we cope with animals, and our disgust responses to them, by attributing mental states that mark them as inferior beings. To develop my proposal, I draw from recent research on dehumanization and infrahumanization. (shrink)

Background Biobank participants often do not understand much of the information they are provided as part of the informed consent process, despite numerous attempts at simplifying consent forms and improving their readability. We report the first assessment of biobank enrollees’ comprehension under an "integrated consent” process, where patients were asked to enroll in a research biobank as part of their normal healthcare experience. A number of healthcare systems have implemented similar integrated consent processes for biobanking, but it is unknown how (...) much patients understand after enrolling under these conditions. Methods: We recruited patients who enrolled in a biobank while in a healthcare setting when receiving ordinary care. We assessed knowledge of consent materials using 11 true/false questions drawn from a well-known biobank knowledge test. After reviewing the results from 114 participants, we revised the consent form and repeated the knowledge assessment with 144 different participants. Results: Participants scored poorly on the knowledge test in both rounds, with no significant differences in overall scores or individual items between the rounds. In Phase 1, participants answered 53% of the questions correctly, 25% incorrectly, and 22% “I don’t know.” In Phase 2, participants answered 53% of questions correctly, 24% incorrectly, and 23% “I don’t know.” Participants scored particularly poorly on questions about data sharing and accessing medical records. Conclusions: Enrollees under an integrated consent model had significant misunderstandings that persisted despite an attempt to improve information specifically about those topics in a consent form. These results raise challenges for current approaches that attribute misunderstanding to overly complex consent forms. They also suggest that the pressures of the clinic may compound other problems with patient understanding of biobank consent. As health systems increasingly blend research and care, they may need to rethink their approach to educating patients about participation in a biobank. (shrink)

If patients are to be partners rather than subjects, contributing effectively to clinical research in which they have an interest, both they and investigators must change their ways. The case is argued here that the conduct of clinical research fulfils an essential need of society and that, therefore, in the interests of society, there is a moral imperative that it be done. Further essays will develop this theme, questioning along the way whether consent is a redundant concept.

How do we think about animals? How do we decide what they deserve and how we ought to treat them? Subhuman takes an interdisciplinary approach to these questions, drawing from research in philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, law, history, sociology, economics, and anthropology. Subhuman argues that our attitudes to nonhuman animals, both positive and negative, largely arise from our need to compare ourselves to them.

I agree with Burns that an evolutionary theory is required, but I question his multifactorial premise. The arguments for an evolutionary theory are stronger, and one that is more precise than that presented by Burns has already been formulated. This theory, that schizophrenia is “the price that Homo sapiens pays for language,” (Crow 1997a; 2000b, 2004c), generates testable predictions absent from Burns' presentation.